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ABSTRACT
Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) infections frequently complicate the post-operative 
course of transplant recipients, and despite nasal carriage and endemic colonization, MRSA outbreaks 
are not commonly described. This study reports a case of MRSA outbreak and discusses infection control 
measures and recommendations for this situation.
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Abbreviations:
MRSA – methicillin resistant Staphylococcus aureus
LT – liver transplantation
ICU – intensive care unit
SSI – surgical site infection
TU – transplantation unit
RAPD – random amplified polymorphic DNA
INTRODUCTION
Bacterial infections are the primary infection 
complication in patients submitted to solid 
organ transplantation. In liver transplantation 
(LT), they generally occur in 30% to 55% of 
the cases, especially during the first and second 
months after the procedure, raising morbidity 
and mortality. Up to 60% of these infections 
are caused by Gram-positive microorganisms, 
mainly Staphylococcus aureus (S. aureus).1,2 
These infections vary according to microor-
ganism virulence and antimicrobial resistance 
profile.3
Many transplanted patients are colonized 
by S. aureus. Colonization can occur in the 
pre- or post-transplantation period and is as-
sociated with several factors, such as surgery 
duration, altimicrobial use, permanency in 
the Intensive Care Unity (ICU), drains and 
catheter use, excessive manipulation, and dis-
ease severity.1,4,5
S. aureus profile resistance depends on 
methicillin susceptibility. Methicillin- re-
sistant S. aureus (MRSA) displays a mecA 
gene, which orders a modified penicillin- 
binding protein - PBP-2 that decreases its 
affinity for penicillin.
MRSA colonization prior to LT occurs in 
5.1% to 47.4% of the cases4-9 and can be associ-
ated with a higher risk of infection.5-7,10
Although some studies have established a 
correlation between MRSA colonization and 
infection with LT patients, outbreaks are not 
frequent,5-7,10 possibly due to infection control 
measures. Singh et al. demonstrated reduction in 
colonization and infection after the adoption of 
infection control measures, based on the identifi-
cation of nasal or rectal MRSA carriage by swabs, 
contact precautions, patient cohort, nasal decolo-
nization with mupirocin, and instructions for pa-
tients and visitors.8 Thus, S. aureus identification 
and dissemination control should be a priority 
action in transplantation units.11,12
The present study describes a MRSA surgi-
cal site infection (SSI) outbreak in a transplan-
tation unit (TU) and discusses measures for 
dissemination control of this microorganism 
using epidemiological, microbiological, and 
molecular biology tools.
METHODS
This is a prospective descriptive study that in-
cluded patients submitted to transplantation 
who presented with SSI due to MRSA notified 
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in a TU. The study was performed in a tertiary care medical 
training center of a university hospital located in Belo Hori-
zonte, Minas Gerais, Brazil, from September 2004 to May 
2005, the period defined for case notification, establishment 
of actions, and surveillance. Outbreak control was defined as 
four weeks after the last case.
Cases were identified through a daily active search 
in medical records and laboratory microbiological 
results. Infection notification was made by National 
Nosocomial Surveillance System criteria.13 The proc-
ess followed local Hospital Infection Control Com-
mittee instructions and was monitored via completion 
of specific forms and a database constructed for this 
purpose.
The index case was the first post-transplant patient at TU 
notified with SSI due to MRSA isolated in a surgical wound 
sample. Cases were defined as all other patients with SSI or 
colonization due to MRSA after transplantation procedure. 
Statistical analysis confirmed the outbreak by the event in-
creased frequency, which meant an incidence above the ex-
pected number of cases. 
During the outbreak, patient nasal and rectal swabs 
were performed routinely at TU admission and repeated 
weekly (except if the patient was previously colonized or 
infected by MRSA). Nasal swabs from healthcare workers 
were also collected.
Microbiological cultures were performed using com-
mercial media - BioMérieux®. After a 24-hour incuba-
tion at 35º C, the staphylococcal colonies suspected by 
the Gram method were confirmed with enzymatic and 
biochemical tests. The oxacillin diffusion disk in agar 
(Kirby-Bauer) was used to define methicillin resistance, 
as per standardization recommended by the Clinical and 
Laboratory Standards Institute.14
MRSA genotypic study was performed using molecular 
biology techniques. Surgical wound samples isolated during 
the outbreak and specimens from patients hospitalized in 
other units were studied by Random Amplified Polymor-
phic DNA (RAPD) amplification for genetic similarity. Cri-
teria established by Tenover et al. were considered for genetic 
grouping and definition of the same genotypic strain.15
Risk factor analysis was performed by matching cases versus 
controls. Controls were defined as patients who were submitted 
to transplantation without MRSA SSI. Variables studied were 
length of stay in the hospital, ICU, and TU hospitalization pe-
riod prior to MRSA infection or colonization, number of days 
with central venous catheter, and antimicrobial use. Student’s 
t-test was used for comparison between the groups and statisti-
cal significance was considered when p ≤ 0.05.
This study was approved by the Institutional Ethical 
Committee. 
RESULTS
Index case: MRSA SSI was identified on September 27, 
2004, and ten other cases have been notified from then un-
til April 14, 2005. A total of 11 patients met the criteria for 
case definition.
Description of cases: nine (81.8%) patients were sub-
mitted to LT; one patient received renal transplantation, and 
another patient received bone marrow transplantation and 
required an exploratory laparotomy after a suspicion of ap-
pendicitis. Seven cases (63.6%) presented with superficial 
SSI (six LT patients and one renal transplantation patient). 
Four other cases (36.4%) presented with deep SSI (three of 
them after LT and one after bone marrow transplantation).
Genotypic and phenotypic profiles: all 11 S. aureus 
strains identified in transplanted recipients with SSI 
were oxacillin-resistant, but vancomycin-sensitive. Fig-
ure 1 shows 11 S. aureus strains studied by RAPD am-
plification, using three different starters (1A, 1B, 1C). 
Figure 2 presents a phylogenetic study demonstrating 
90% of similarity among MRSA samples with a discrimi-
natory power of D = 0.409.
Figure 1: Genotypic analysis by Random Amplified Polymorphic DNA amplification of MRSA strains from outbreak and other 
institutional settings.
Figure 1A
Figure 1B
Figure 1C
*P Standard Ф 174/HaeIII; 1 to 11 - Patient samples; C- Negative control s image file number 1
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1A       P    1      2    3     4     5      6    7     8     9   10    11   C
1B          P     1      2    3     4      5      6     7     8      9    10    11   C
1C         P    1      2     3     4      5     6     7     8     9    10    11   C
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Table 1. Risk factors for patients MRSA colonization or infection
    Patients without MrSA SSI              Patients with MrSA SSI 
  N Mean SD Minimum Maximum N Mean SD Minimum  Maximum p value
Hospital stay before  39 1.0 1.0 5 0 8 1.0 1.0 2 0 0.53 
transplantation
TU stay 50 5.1 10.5 72 1 7 3.4 1.3 6 2 0.30
ICU stay 9 10.4 8.7 23 0 8 26.7 21.7 66 0 0.06
CVC use (in days) 37 6.3 11.4 63 0 7 3.9 1.3 6 2 0.22
ATM use before 33 27 3.7 22 1 12 2.7 1.0 4 1 1.00 
MRSA identification 
(in days)
MRSA: methicillin resistant S. aureus; SSI: surgical site infection; TU: transplantation unit; ICU: intensive care unit; CVC: 
central venous catheter; ATM: antimicrobial.
Figure 2: Phylogenetic similarity of MRSA samples from 
outbreak and other institutional settings.
Table 2 - Infection control measures adopted during MRSA SSI outbreak
Control measures 
Hand hygienization with 2% chlorhexidine for healthcare workers.
Contact precautions for all colonized or infected patients (gloves and gowns in contact with patient); patient and 
healthcare worker cohort.
Nasal and rectal swab cultures (excluding those with known prior colonization).
Nasal swab cultures of health assistance team.
Frequent meetings with assistance team and Hospital Infection Control Committee.
MRSA: methicillin resistant S. aureus; SSI: surgical site infection.  
DISCUSSION
S. aureus is an important agent related to infection in solid 
organ transplantation, especially in LT recipients. The most 
common form of acquisition is prior colonization or noso-
comial cross-transmission associated with antimicrobial use 
and invasive procedures. Although MRSA colonization or 
infection is common in solid organ transplantation recipi-
ents, outbreaks are not frequently described. The approach 
and management of this situation usually focuses on indi-
vidual aspects. This study allows a discussion of systematic 
practices and infection control/prevention measures based 
on a multidisciplinary board.
Outbreak investigation
During an outbreak, case definition is recommended. In this 
study, case was defined as a transplanted patient admitted 
to the TU with MRSA isolation in a swab or in any sam-
ple associated with site infection. After that, to identify the 
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Routine investigation: swab cultures from patients at 
TU admission did not identify prior colonization. Dur-
ing the outbreak, nasal and rectal swabs were repeated 
weekly and no patient presented with MRSA colonization 
before SSI. Healthcare workers also had nasal swabs per-
formed and no carriers were identified. Risk factors: none of 
the risk factors studied showed statistical significance (Table 
1). Only the ICU showed a tendency towards MRSA infection 
(p = 0.06). No deaths were notified during the follow-up period.
Outbreak control: chlorhexidine 2% was used for hand 
hygienization and contact precautions were recommended 
for care of colonized or infected patients. All infection control 
measures defined by the Hospital Infection Control Committee 
are presented on Table 2. After the adoption of the recommen-
dations, this outbreak was controlled on May 17, 2005.
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total number of cases, transplanted patients underwent 
nasal and rectal swab monitoring; MRSA isolation in any 
sample was also considered. Infection control protocols 
usually include hand hygiene, precautions with gowns 
and gloves, in addition to environment and equipment 
cleansing.
Despite of S. aureus colonization high frequency in 
transplanted patients, in this particular unit MRSA isola-
tion was a rare occurrence, probably because our institu-
tion maintains a low S. aureus methicillin resistance rate. 
Outbreak confirmation requires an increase of a specific 
infection or complication above the background rate. 
During two years before this outbreak, no patients pre-
sented with MRSA SSI at the TU, and so MRSA isolation 
in more than one patient demanded our attention. 
The outbreak involved 11 patients over a six-month 
observation period. A case versus control study was per-
formed and the source investigation comprised MRSA 
carrier admission, healthcare workers contamination 
during surgery, and cross-transmission in the ICU, TU, 
or other hospital units. From all variables studied, only 
the ICU stay showed a tendency for MRSA infection (p = 
0.06), suggesting a cross-transmission that might occur 
in this setting. At our transplantation service, patients 
are assisted in the ICU for at least 48 hours after the pro-
cedure. MRSA-colonized patients presented a mean TU 
stay of 26.7 days compared to 10.4 days for patients with-
out MRSA SSI.
Swab cultures are routinely performed before surgery 
and in the ICU when patients stay for seven days or more. 
As no patient was identified as having MRSA at TU or 
ICU admission, posterior colonization was considered 
due to broken barriers. It is noted that swab sensitivity 
varies enormously, depending on the number of samples 
collected, and it is not possible to exclude MRSA cross-
transmission in the ICU.
All stains demonstrate the same antibiogram pat-
tern, with resistance to all antimicrobials tested, except 
for vancomycin. Genotypic analysis by RAPD included 
eleven samples (MRSA from institucional settings and 
outbreak strains) and confirmed the hypothesis of ge-
netic correlation (with 90% similarity, besides micro 
heterogeneity among samples - Figure 2). Genotypic 
analysis by Pulsed Field Gel Electrophoresis, Restric-
tion Fragment Length Polymorphism, or RAPD should 
be used whenever possible with this purpose. However, 
these techniques present different primers and lack of 
interpretation standardization. RAPD showed quicker 
results as has been demonstrated by several studies.16,17 
The combination of three different starters in this study 
improved the discriminatory power (D = 0.409), and this 
low value could be justified by a high genetic correlation 
among the samples.
Clinical aspects
S. aureus nasal or rectal colonization is frequent in trans-
planted patients, and S. aureus systemic infections, espe-
cially sepsis, still remain as an important cause of serious 
complications.8 Additionally, cirrhotic patients show greater 
S. aureus colonization rates,18 and the association between 
staphylococcal colonization and infection has been dis-
cussed in several studies.
Bert et al. showed that 87.5% of MRSA infections oc-
curred in previously colonized patients compared to 10.1% 
of non-colonized patients (p < 0.001).6 Desai et al. describe 
a greater risk for MRSA sepsis in previously colonized pa-
tients compared to non-colonized individuals (p = 0.002).7 
In a retrospective cohort, sensitive or resistant S. aureus 
colonization was also an independent factor for post-trans-
plantation infection, according to multivariate analysis 
(p = 0.0004 and p < 0.0001; respectively).4 Hashimoto et 
al. demonstrated that patients colonized by MRSA after the 
transplant showed higher infection rates compared to those 
non-colonized (p=0.001).10 Also according to Hashimoto et 
al., higher MRSA infection rates occurred in patients with 
prior colonization (p = 0.04 and odds ratio: 3.5).5
Swab monitoring: some authors recommend swab moni-
toring at admission and periodically after transplantation, 
considering increased infection rates in previously colo-
nized patients. Coia et al. suggest that swabs must be re-
peated weekly or monthly, depending on local prevalence.19 
The identification of colonized individuals could allow con-
tact precautions, patient cohorts, decolonization, and edu-
cational information for patients and their visitors.5,7,8,10 In 
accordance with British guidelines, swab monitoring or ac-
tive surveillance cultures should be considered according to 
hospital epidemiological profile and MRSA prevalence for 
patients from Critical Care Units, including TU.19 Moreover, 
other variables must be observed, such as prior coloniza-
tion, hospital admissions and transfers from hospitals with 
a high MRSA prevalence. In the present study, swabs from 
transplanted patients and healthcare workers aimed at car-
rier identification. Our results showed that no patient was 
considered as previously colonized and no professional was 
considered a MRSA carrier. Nevertheless, swab monitoring 
is still controversial, especially in institutions with a high 
endemic MRSA prevalence, because the impact of monitor-
ing measures, in this situation, is reduced. Harbarth et al., 
comparing different periods with and without MRSA swab 
monitoring by PCR, showed no statistical difference among 
MRSA infection rates (p = 0.29).9
Site colonization: transplanted patients could present con-
comitant nasal and rectal colonization rates up to 25.5%,20 as 
they show a higher infection risk when compared to those with 
only nasal colonization (p = 0.025 and odds ratio = 23.9). We 
highlight the fact that S. aureus decolonization is difficult due to 
the intestinal reservoir, and mere nasal decolonization could be 
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useless. In the present study, no patient was recognized as 
having prior rectal colonization, but rectal swab sensitivity 
is no more than 70%, which limits carrier identification 
and restricts preventive measures to avoid dissemination.
Mortality: although high mortality rates associated with 
S. aureus infections are described in several studies,1,2,11,12 
no deaths associated with MRSA SSI occured during this 
outbreak. The majority of SSI were superficial, presenting 
low severity with better treatment response. In a study of 
165 liver transplant patients, Singh et al. described vascu-
lar catheter infection as the main site (n = 15), followed 
by SSI and the abdominal site (n = 7 each), in addition to 
five pulmonary infections.11 Higher mortality (86%) was 
observed in patients with abdominal or pulmonary infec-
tions. Torre-Cisneros et al., in a study with 405 patients 
submitted to LT, defined S. aureus as the only independent 
variable associated with mortality.12
Prophylaxis: MRSA identification contributes to sur-
gical prophylaxis definition. In our Transplantation 
Service, the surgical prophylaxis protocol included cefo-
taxime plus ampicillin during the first 48 hours. This al-
lows a good coverage, with adequate levels at the surgical 
site and relative safety. Considering a MRSA prevalence 
of approximately 35% at our hospital, glycopeptides as 
antimicrobial prophylaxis are indicated only for patients 
previously colonized by MRSA or who display hypersen-
sitivity to first-choice drugs. During this outbreak, glyco-
peptides prophylaxis was discussed, but not used, since 
no previously colonized patients were identified. Fur-
thermore, there is a selective advantage enjoyed by MRSA 
in the presence of antimicrobial exposure that facilitates 
patient-to-patient cross-transmission.
Decolonization: MRSA decolonization for LT candi-
dates is controversial. In a meta-analysis by van Rijem et 
al., nasal mupirocin reduced decolonization and S. aureus 
infection after transplantation (p = 0.02, RR 0.55, and 95% 
CI 0.34-0.89).21 Although routine MRSA decolonization 
is supported by literature, in this outbreak its use was not 
indicated due to high recolonization rates, especially for 
patients with an intestinal reservoir or frequent and pro-
longed hospital admissions. In one study, 27 patients colo-
nized by S. aureus used mupirocin and 37% recolonized.22 
Seven of these patients, previously colonized by sensitive 
S. aureus, were recolonized by MRSA. The authors empha-
sized that intestinal MRSA could be a source that cannot be 
eliminated by nasal mucopirocin and chlorhexidine bath. 
Besides, mupirocin resistance has been described.
Prevention: standard and contact precautions are nec-
essary and should be followed by all professionals and visi-
tors, including in home care. Instructions, such as hand 
washing, contact precautions, swab monitoring, patient 
cohorts, and regular meetings with the assistance team 
were efficient in controlling this outbreak (Table 2). How-
ever, transmission control among special patients brings 
up new challenges. Transplanted liver patients are immu-
nosuppressed, and have a possible S. aureus gastrointesti-
nal reservoir and an extended surgical area.
Conclusion: MRSA outbreaks in transplant recipients 
have rarely been described. The present study demonstrates 
the importance of epidemiologic and molecular tools in 
outbreak investigation. Infection control measures were ef-
fective to limit dissemination, although no source of infec-
tion had been identified. Colonization monitoring allows 
carrier identification and facilitates decisions, contact pre-
cautions, decolonization and antimicrobial prophilaxis. A 
specific protocol including infection control recommenda-
tions would facilitate handling with future similar events.
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